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I, LLOYD OFFERS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE ALLEGATION 
THAT THE INTENDED TRANSFERS WOULD HAVE BEEN ILLEGAL, 
CAUSING HIS ENTIRE UNCLEAN HANDS THEORY TO FAIL. 
Like the trial court below, Lloyd argues that the transfer of the property from 
Alta's trust to Lloyd based on his fraudulent representations and Lloyd's fraudulent 
promise to return that property to Alta's Tmst after Alta's death (the "Plan") constituted a 
misrepresentation to the Medicaid authorities. But Lloyd can point to no evidence that 
identifies that a representation was made, much less that it was a misrepresentation. He 
simply assumes that happened. His burden was to affirmatively establish that Alton had 
unclean hands. Winn v. Mannhalter, 708 P.2d 444, 451 (Alaska 1985) (since unclean 
hands is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish it). 
In his brief, Lloyd argues that Alton "ignores" his own~testimony "and the plain 
meaning of the Medicaid requirements." Appellee's Brief at 8-9. No where does Lloyd 
identify what testimony Alton allegedly ignored. In fact, Alton identified all of the 
potentially relevant testimony, the same testimony identified by Lloyd. See Appellant's 
Brief at 10-11. 
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Regarding Lloyd's claim that Alton "ignore[d] . . . the plain meaning of the 
Medicaid requirements," Lloyd selectively quotes 42 USC Section 1396p(c)(l)1 regarding 
a party's eligibility for Medicaid as follows: 
. . . if an institutionalized individual. . . disposes of assets for less than fair market 
value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual 
is ineligible for medical assistance for services . . . . 
Lloyd thus does not cite the balance of the subsection (1). The quotation continues as 
follows: 
. . . described in subparagraph (C)(i) (or in the case of a non-institutionalized 
individual, for the services described in paragraph (C)(ii)) during the period 
beginning on the date specified in paragraph (D) and equal to the number of 
months specified in paragraph (E). 
Subparagraph (C)(i) identifies nursing care facilities, institutional facilities that offer 
nursing care, and home or community based services. Subparagraph (C)(ii) describes 
certain long term care services for noninstitutionalized individuals. Subparagraph (D) 
identifies the beginning date with reference both to the date of the transfer and whether 
the transfer occurred in any other period of ineligibility. Subparagraph E defines the 
period of ineligibility based on a fraction, the numerator of which is the total value of the 
assets transferred and the denominator is the average monthly cost of institutionalized 
care. It is easy to see why Lloyd quoted this statute selectively. There are numerous facts 
1
 For convenience of the court, Alton attaches a copy of the relevant statute as 
Exhibit A. It is also part of Lloyd's appendix to his Appellee's brief. 
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needed to determine whether a person is ineligible for Medicaid, none of which are part 
of the record. 
Moreover, Lloyd also quotes subsection (b)(1) of Section 1396p as follows: 
. . . the state shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in (a)(1)(B), the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or upon sale of the 
property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the individual.... 
Appellee's Brief at 9. While Lloyd does not explicitly address the relevance of this part of 
the Medicaid statute, he apparently is seeking to leave the impression that a court ordered 
constructive trust will leave the property subject to an "adjustment or recovery." Even if 
this provision is applicable to this case, an adjustment or recovery does not make the 
constructive trust remedy illegal or improper. In any event, it is noteworthy to look at the 
"individual described in (a)(1)(B)." That subsection states: 
(1) No lien may be imposed against the property of an individual prior to his death 
on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State 
plan, except 
(B) in the case of real property of an individual -
(i) who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is required 
as a condition of receiving services in such institution under the State plan, 
to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of his income 
for personal needs, and 
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(ii) with respect to whom the State determines . . . that he cannot reasonably 
be expected to be discharged from the medical institution and to return 
home. 
There is no evidence in the record regarding whether Alta received institutional care, and 
if so, where that occurred, nor is there any evidence whether she could "reasonably be 
expected . . . to return home." Thus, there is simply no evidentiary basis to determine if 
the State must seek or would have ever sought an "adjustment or recovery." In fact, Alton 
was prepared to call a Medicaid representative to testify. See R. 242, Transcript 5.2 
However, since there was no evidence that a representation or misrepresentation had in 
fact occurred, there was no need to call the Medicaid representative as a witness. 
Accordingly, the trial court's factual finding that Alton misrepresented the facts to 
Medicaid are clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
II. ALTON'S ACTIONS WERE NOT WILFUL AS THEY WERE 
FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED BY LLOYD. 
Lloyd strains to outline where Alton allegedly acted wilfully and with sufficient 
knowledge. However, Lloyd omits that each of his examples of wilfulness and 
knowledge were perpetuated by the fraudulent inducements of Lloyd. Alton 
unequivocally stated that, but for Lloyd's representations regarding the Plan, Alton would 
never have agreed to it. T.78-79 
2
 The entire transcript is contained at record page 242. All future references to the 
transcript will be designated as "T. [page number of transcript]." 
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Lloyd cites to petitioner's initial brief, referencing the Lawrence article correctly 
stating that the doctrine of unclean hands "usually involved fraud, illegality, unfairness, or 
bad faith." See William J. Lawrence III, Note, The Application of the Cleans hands 
Doctrine in Damage Actions, 57 Notre Dame Law, 673 Notre Dame Lawyer (1982). 
Lloyd infers while Alton's actions were not fraudulent, they fit another of the enumerated 
qualifications. Appellee's Brief at 11-12. Alton has not acted fraudulently, illegally, 
unfairly or in bad faith. In fact, the trial court found it was Lloyd who acted as such. See 
R. 150, FOF 1fl[ 4, 5; 151, FOF ffl[ 22, 23; 153, FOF ffif 9, 12. Lloyd also quotes from 
Petitioner's brief stating: "Any wilful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully 
can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for invocation 
of the maxim..." Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. V. Automotive M. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 
815 (1945). Appellee's Brief at 12. Lloyd again omits the overwhelming findings of fact 
holding that it was he who acted fraudulently and purposely induced Alton into Lloyd*s 
Plan. Lloyd submits that an act that is fraudulently induced cannot be considered 
knowing or wilful. Nothing Alton did transgressed equitable standards of conduct 
sufficient to invoke the unclean hands doctrine. In fact, it is Lloyd that has transgressed 
all equitable standards of conduct. 
Lloyd's relies on dicta in the Pledger case without examining its context. Pledger 
v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572 (Utah 1999). The Pledger court noted specifically that it was 
Pledger that sought additional sums from his patient after he had been paid his 
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contractually due charges by the patient's insurance company. Id. at 577. The court 
brands Pledger with unclean hands because of his "instigation and advancement" of the 
litigation after knowing his contract with the insurance company was valid and after he 
had been paid his contractually due amount. The phrase "whether knowingly or not" is 
dicta and is inapplicable to the case. The court makes no holding regarding fraudulently 
induced or unknowing actions because no unknowing actions by Pledger existed. Lloyd's 
assertion that such a holding exists is misplaced. 
III. A REASONED WEIGHING OF THE ACTIONS AND EQUITIES OF 
THE PARTIES GREATLY FAVORS ALTON. 
Lloyd correctly recites the discretion enjoyed by the trial court in weighing the 
evidence and balancing the equities in pursuit of justice. However, while it is true the 
court is afforded wide discretion in deciding such matters, the court's discretion must be 
rooted in some directly related findings of fact. The trial court's findings do not support 
the ultimate conclusions it reached. As outlined in Petitioner's initial brief, even a 
cursory weighing of the actions and equities of the parties illustrates that Lloyd was the 
wrongdoer. See Appellant's initial Brief at 15, 16. The court's findings of fact clearly 
illustrate this conclusion. See R. 150, FOF ffif 4, 5; 151, FOF Tflf 22, 23; 153, FOF fflf 9, 
12. 
Lloyd makes no attempt to substantiate the trial court's conclusion by conducting 
his own weighing. Lloyd only alleges that the public interest is better served by denying 
Alton relief. Appellee's Brief at 14. Lloyd utterly fails to acknowledge that the injury 
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exposed to the public from his fraudulent and purposeful actions pose a far greater risk 
and inequity than does the innocent and manipulated actions of Alton. As a matter of 
public policy, Utah courts should not allow the defrauding party to gain and profit, while 
the party whose actions were fraudulently induced is harmed. Alton believes this Court 
should weigh the equities based on the facts, since the trial court failed to do so. 
Lloyd concludes by stating "even if the equities must be balanced, it is not 
inappropriate to give great weight that the proposed transaction would be illegal." 
Appellee's Brief at 15. As clearly outlined in Section I, supra, this contention fails since 
no evidentiary basis exists to find that the intended transfer was or would have been 
illegal. Furthermore, even if it were found that the intended transfer would have been 
illegal, while it may be appropriate to consider that fact, that fact alone is not dispositive. 
The court must still have a reasonable basis for exercising its discretion. Here the trial 
court did not do so. Thus, notwithstanding the broad discretion given to trial court's in 
this matter, in this case the trial court abused its discretion based on its own findings of 
fact. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court erred when it found misconduct by Alton based on 
assumed facts without record evidence to support them; because Alton's actions were not 
wilful due to Lloyd's fraudulent inducement and; because a balanced weighing of the 
equities and actions of each party heavily favors of Alton, Alton asks this Court to 
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reverse the trial court, to order the Court to impose a constructive trust on the Homestead, 
and to remand this case for further proceedings consistent with the Court's decision. 
Dated this 2nd day of April, 2004. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C 
y ^ ^ & E R T N. PRAr^rrffl^V'" 
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RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure: 
17 Fed Proc L Ed, Health, Education, and Welfare § 42:422. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
aliditv of regulations est favors enforcement of public policy as expressed 
t t S v e relief in Medicaid statutes and regulations, because plain-
junctive ^
 m a k e v . a b i e d a i m ^ p r o p o s e d ]ncrease runs 
lidity of regulations afoul of 42 USCS § 1396o requirement that any cost 
dicaid recipients' challenge to federal regula- sharing be "nominal." Kansas Hosp_Ass ri v wn.te-
mplementing 42 USCS § 1396o(a)(3), which man (1993, DC Kan) 835 F Supp 1548,42 Soc Sec 
es copayments to be "nominal in amount," Rep Serv 708. 
fail even though copayment for inpatient hos- Preliminary injunction is denied hospitals ami 
erv'ices in Kansas is $325, where Congress has individuals challenging proposed amendment to state 
•d parenthetically in statute, definition of Medicaid plan, where state submitted evidence 
in'al in amount" long codified in 42 CFR showing that proposed increase of co-payment to 
54(c) because court is bound by Secretary's $325 was determined after applying 5U percent to 
relation, since it has been given force and ef- average, or typical, amount agency pays for eacn aay 
if law by legislative reenactment and ratifica- of inpatient hospital care for Medicaid recipients, 
Kansas Hosp. Ass'n v Whiteman (1994, DC because plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on meir 
851 F Supp 401, 44 Soc Sec Rep Serv 524. claim that proposed co-payment is not nonm*in 
P P
 amount" as required by 42 USCS § 1396o(a)(3), 
junctive relief (b)(3), since amount is consistent with federal regu-
te is temporarily restrained from implementing lations permitting state to impose fixed ^ P 3 ^ " 1 
dment to increase co-payment requirement of amount for inpatient hospital care. Kansas; nosp. 
caid beneficiaries from $25 to $325 per admis- Ass'n v Whiteman (1993, ^ / f ^ S " ^ 
for inpatient hospital services, where hospitals 1556, 42 Soc Sec Rep Serv 716, 4ADD 32 ,tfta 
ndividuals showed that amendment may cause without op sub nom Williams v Whiteman i n -
separable harm, outweighing any potential CA10 Kan) 36 F3d 1106, reported in^ full (1W, 
ge caused state by delay, and that public inter- CA10 Kan) 1994 US App LEXIS 25 TO. 
396p. Liens, adjustments and recoveries, and transfers of assets 
Imposition of lien against the property of an individual on account of 
medical assistance rendered to him under a State plan. (1) No hen may 
>e imposed against the property of any individual prior to his death on ac-
orn* of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under tne otaie 
>lan, except— . , 
(A) pursuant to the judgment of a court on account of benefits incorrectly 
paid on behalf of such individual, or 
<B) in the case of the real property of an individual— 
(i) who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility 
for the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individ-
ual is required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution 
under the State plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a 
minimal amount of his income required for personal needs, and 
(ii) with respect to whom the State determines, after notice and op-
portunity for a hearing (in accordance with procedures established by 
the State), that he cannot reasonably be expected to be discharged trom 
the medical institution and to return home, 
except as provided in paragraph (2). 
(2) No lien may be imposed under paragraph (1)(B) on such individual s 
home if— 
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(A) the spouse of such individual, 
(B) such individual's child who is under age 21, or (with respect to States 
eligible to participate in the State program established under title XVI [42 
USCS §§ 1381 et seq ]) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or 
(with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such 
program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS 
§ 1382c], or 
(C) a sibling of such individual (who has an equity interest in such home 
and who was residing in such individual's home for a period of at least 
one year immediately before the date of the individual's admission to the 
medical institution), 
is lawfully residing in such home. 
(3) Any hen imposed with respect to an individual pursuant to paragraph 
(1)(B) shall dissolve upon that individual's discharge from the medical 
institution and return home. 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a 
State plan. (1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance cor-
rectly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, 
except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assis-
tance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the Stale plan in the 
case of the following individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a)(1)(B), the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or 
upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical 
assistance paid on behalf of the individual. 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when 
the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical 
assistance consisting of— 
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and 
related hospital and prescription drug services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan. 
(C)(i) In the case of an individual who has received (or is entitled to 
receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in connection 
with which assets or resources are disregarded in the manner described 
in clause (ii), except as provided in such clause, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate on account of medi-
cal assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility and 
other long-term care services. 
(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an individual who received 
medical assistance under a State plan of a State which had a State plan 
amendment approved as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the dis-
regard of any assets or resources— 
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a long-term care in-
surance policy; or 
(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled to receive) 
benefits under a long-term care insurance policy. 
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(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after 
the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time— 
(A) when he has no surviving child who is under age 21, or (with respect 
to States eligible to participate in the State program established under title 
XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and totally dis-
abled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in 
such program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS 
§ 1382c]; and 
(B) in the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection 
(a)(1)(B), when— 
(i) no sibling of the individual (who was residing in the individual's 
home for a period of at least one year immediately before the date of 
the individual's admission to the medical institution), and 
(ii) no son or daughter of the individual (who was residing in the 
individual's home for a period of at least two years immediately before 
the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution, and 
who establishes to the satisfaction of the State that he or she provided 
care to such individual which permitted such individual to reside at 
home rather than in an institution), 
is lawfully residing in such home who has lawfully resided in such home 
on a continuous basis since the date of the individual's admission to the 
medical institution. 
(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with stan-
dards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall waive the 
application of this subsection (other than paragraph.(l)(C)) if such applica-
tion would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of criteria 
established by the Secretary. 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual— 
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate 
law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to'whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and 
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), includ-
ing such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased in-
dividual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
(c) Taking into account certain transfers of assets. (1)(A) In order to meet 
the requirements of this subsection for purposes of section 1902(a)(18) 
[42 USCS § 1396a(a)(18)], the State plan must provide that if an 
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the 
option of a State, a noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such 
an individual) disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or af-
ter the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual is 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
ineligible for medical assistance for services described in subparagraph 
(C)(i) (or, in the case of a nonmstitutionalized individual, for the services 
described m subparagraph (C)(n)) during the period beginning on the date 
specified in subparagraph (D) and equal to the number of months speci-
fied in subparagraph (E). 
(B)(i) The look-back date specified m this subparagraph is a date that is 
36 months (or, in the case of payments from a trust or portions of a 
trust that are treated as assets disposed of by the individual pursuant to 
paragraph (3)(A)(iii) or (3)(B)(ii) of subsection (d), 60 months) before 
the date specified in clause (ii). 
(li) The date specified in this clause, with respect to— 
(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of which the in-
dividual both is an institutionalized individual and has applied for 
medical assistance under the State plan, or 
(II) a nonmstitutionalized individual is the date on which the indi-
vidual applies for medical assistance under the State plan or, if later, 
the date on which the individual disposes of assets for less than fair 
market value. 
(C)(i) The services described in this subparagraph with respect to an 
institutionalized individual are the following: 
(I) Nursing facility services. 
(II) A level of care in any institution equivalent to that of nursing 
facility services. 
(HI) Home or community-based services furnished under a waiver 
granted under subsection (c) or (d) of section 1915 [42 USCS 
§ 1396n(c) or (d)]. 
(ii) The services described in this subparagraph with respect to a 
nonmstitutionalized individual are services (not including any services 
described in clause (i)) that are described in paragraph (7), (22), or (24) 
of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(7), (22), or (24)], and, at the 
option of a State, other long-term care services for which medical as-
sistance is otherwise available under the State plan to individuals 
requiring long-term care. 
(D) The date specified in this subparagraph is the first day of the first 
month during or after which assets have been transferred for less than fair 
market value and which does not occur in any other periods of ineligibil-
ity under this subsection. 
(E)(i) With respect to an institutionalized individual, the number of 
months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall 
be equal to— 
(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transferred 
by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or after the look-back 
date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), divided by 
(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility 
services in the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community 
in which the individual is institutionalized) at the time of applica-
tion. 
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(ii) With respect to a nonmstitutionalized individual, the number of 
months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall 
not be greater than a number equal to— 
(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transferred 
by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or after the look-back 
date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), divided by 
(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility 
services in the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community 
in which the individual is institutionalized) at the time of applica-
tion. 
(iii) The number of months of ineligibility otherwise determined under 
clause (i) or (ii) with respect to the disposal of an asset shall be 
reduced— 
(I) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under clause (i), 
by the number of months of ineligibility applicable to the individual 
under clause (ii) as a result of such disposal, and 
(II) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under clause 
(ii), by the number of months of ineligibility applicable to the indi-
vidual under clause (i) as a result of such disposal. 
(2) An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of 
paragraph (1) to the extent that— 
(A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was 
transferred to— 
(i) the spouse of such individual; 
(ii) a child of such individual who (I) is under age 21, or (II) (with re-
spect to States eligible to participate in the State program established 
under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to 
participate in such program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 
1614 [42 USCS § 1382c]; 
(iii) a sibling of such individual who has an equity interest in such 
home and who was residing in such individual's home for a period of 
at least one year immediately before the date the individual becomes 
an institutionalized individual; or 
(iv) a son or daughter of such individual (other than a child described 
in clause (ii)) who was residing in such individual's home for a period 
of at least two years immediately before the date the individual 
becomes an institutionalized individual, and who (as determined by the 
State) provided care to such individual which permitted such individ-
ual to reside at home rather than in such an institution or facility; 
(B) the assets— 
(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to another for the sole 
benefit of the individual's spouse, 
(ii) were transferred from the individual's spouse to another for the sole 
benefit of the individual's spouse, 
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subsection (d)(4)) established solely for the benefit of, the individual's 
child described in subparagraph (A)(n)(II), or 
(iv) were transferred to a trust (including a trust described in subsec-
tion (d)(4)) established solely for the benefit of an individual under 65 
years of age who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42 
USCS § 1382c(a)(3)l; 
(C) a satisfactory showing is made to the State (in accordance with 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the individual intended 
to dispose of the assets either at fair market value, or for other valuable 
consideration, (ii) the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose 
other than to qualify for medical assistance, or (iii) all assets transferred 
for less than fair market value have been returned to the individual; or 
(D) the State determines, under procedures established by the State (in 
accordance with standards specified by the Secretary), that the denial of 
eligibility would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of 
criteria established by the Secretary; [.] 
(3) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of an asset held by an indi-
vidual in common with another person or persons in a joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, or similar arrangement, the asset (or the affected portion of such 
asset) shall be considered to be transferred by such individual when any ac-
tion is taken, either by such individual or by any other person, that reduces 
or eliminates such individual's ownership or control of such asset. 
(4) A State (including a State which has elected treatment under section 
1902(f) [42 USCS § 1396a(f)]) may not provide for any period of ineligibil-
ity for an individual due to transfer of resources for less than fair market 
value except in accordance with this subsection. In the case of a transfer by 
the spouse of an individual which results in a period of ineligibility for medi-
cal assistance under a State plan for such individual, a State shall, using a 
reasonable methodology (as specified by the Secretary), apportion such pe-
riod of ineligibility (or any portion of such period) among the individual and 
the individual's spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical 
assistance under the State plan. 
(5) In this subsection, the term "resources" has the meaning given suck 
term in section 1613 [42 USCS § 1382b], without regard to the exclusion 
described in subsection (a)(1) thereof. 
(d) Treatment of trust amounts. (1) For purposes of determining an individu-
al's eligibility for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under this title/ 
[42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], subject to paragraph (4), the rules specified in' 
paragraph (3) shall apply to a trust established by such individual 
(2)(A) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall be considered tQ« 
have established a trust if assets of the individual were used to form all 
or part of the corpus of the trust and if any of the following individuals 
established such trust other than by will: 
(i) The individual, 
(ii) The individual's spouse, 
(iii) A person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
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authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or the 
individual's spouse. 
(iv) A person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon the request of the individual or the individual's 
spouse. 
(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which includes assets of an indi-
vidual (as determined under subparagraph (A)) and assets of any other 
person or persons, the provisions of this subsection shall apply to die por-
tion of the trust attributable to the assets of the individual. 
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply without regard 
to— 
(i) the purposes for which a trust is established, 
(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion under the trust, 
(iii) any restrictions on when or whether distributions may be made 
from the trust, or 
(iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the trust. 
(3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust— 
(i) the corpus of the trust shall be considered resources available to the 
individual, 
(ii) payments from the trust to or for the benefit of the individual shall 
be considered income of the individual, and 
(iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered assets 
disposed of by the individual for purposes of subsection (c). 
(B) In the case of an irrevocable trust— 
(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment from the trust 
could be^made to or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the 
corpus from which, or the income on the corpus from which, payment 
to the individual could be made shall be considered resources available 
to the individual, and payments from that portion of the corpus or 
income— 
(I) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be considered income 
of the individual, and 
(II) for any other purpose, shall be considered a transfer of assets by 
the individual subject to subsection (c); and 
(ii) any portion of the trust from which, or any income on the corpus 
from which, no payment could under any circumstances be made to the 
individual shall be considered, as of the date of establishment of the 
trust (or, if later, the date on which payment to the individual was 
foreclosed) to be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of 
sdbsection (c), and the value of the trust shall be determined for 
purposes of such subsection by including the amount of any payments 
made from such portion of the trust after such date. 
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following trusts: 
(A) A trust containing the assets of an individual under age 65 who is 
disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3) [42 USCS § 1382c(a)(3)]) and 
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which is established for the benefit of such individual by a parent, 
grandparent, legal guardian of the individual, or a court if the State will 
receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such individ-
ual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf 
of the individual under a State plan under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et 
seq.]. 
(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of an individual if— 
(i) the trust is composed only of pension, Social Security, and other 
income to the individual (and accumulated income in the trust), 
(ii) the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the 
death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical as-
sistance paid on behalf of the individual under a State plan under this 
title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], and 
(iii) the State makes medical assistance available to individuals de-
scribed in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) [42 USCS § 1396a(a)(10)(A)-
(ii)(V)], but does not make such assistance available to individuals for 
nursing facility services under section 1902(a)(10)(C) [42 USCS 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)]. 
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as 
defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42 USCS § 1382c(a)(3)] that meets the 
following conditions: 
(i) The trust is established and managed by a non-profit association, 
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust, 
but, for purposes of investment and management of funds, the trust 
pools these accounts. 
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of 
individuals who are disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42 
USCS § 1382c(a)(3)] by the parent, grandparent, or legal guardian of 
such individuals, by such individuals, or by a court, 
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account 
upon the death of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust 
pays to the State from such remaining amounts in the account an 
amount equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on behattf 
of the beneficiary under the State plan under this title [42 USCS 
§§1396 et seq.]. 
(5) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with stan-
dards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency waives the applica-
tion of this subsection with respect to an individual if the individual 
establishes that such application would work an undue hardship on the indi-
vidual as determined on the basis of criteria established by the Secretary. 
(6) The term "trust" includes any legal instrument or device that is similar 
to a trust but includes an annuity only to such extent and in such manner as 
the Secretary specifies. 
(e) Definitions. In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any 
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income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action— 
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's 
spouse. 
(2) The term "income" has the meaning given such term in section 1612 
[42 USCS § 1382a]. 
(3) The term "institutionalized individual" means an individual who is an 
inpatient in a nursing facility, who is an inpatient in a medical institution and 
with respect to whom payment is made based on a level of care provided in 
a nursing facility, or who is described in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI) [42 
USCS § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI)]. 
(4) The term "noninstitutionalized individual" means an individual receiv-
ing any of the services specified in subsection (c)(l)(C)(ii). 
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1613 
[42 USCS § 1382b], without regard (in the case of an institutionalized indi-
vidual) to the exclusion described in subsection (a)(1) of such section. 
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1917, as added Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97-
248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 132(b), 96 Stat. 370; Jan. 12, 1983, P. L. 97-448, 
Title m , § 309(b)(21), (22);96 Stat. 2410; Dec. 22, 1987, P. L; 100-203, Title 
IV, Subtitle C, Part 2, § 4211(h)(12), 101 Stat. 1330-208; July 1, 1988, P.L. 
100-360, Title IH, § 303(b), Title IV, Subtitle B, § 411(1)(3)(1), 102 Stat 760, 
803; Oct. 13, 1988, P.L. 100-485, Title VI, § 608(d)(16)(B), 102 Stat. 2417; 
Dec. 19, 1989, P.L. 101-239, Title VI, Subtitle B, Part 2, § 6411(e)(1), 103 
Stat. 2271; Aug. 10, 1993, P.L. 103-66, Title XIH, Ch 2, Subch B, Part H, 
§§ 13611(aMc), 13612(aMc), 107 Stat. 622, 627.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Explanatory notes: 
The bracketed period has been added at the end of subsec. (c)(2)(D) to 
indicate the probable intent of Congress to include such punctuation. 
Effective date of section: 
Act Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97-248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 132(d), 96 Stat. 373, 
which appears as a note to this section, provided in part that this section 
"shall become effective on the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted 
Sept. 3, 1982]." 
Amendments: 
1983. Act Jan. 12, 1982 (effective as if originally included as a part of this 
section as added by Act Sept. 3, 1982, as provided by § 309(c)(2) of the 
1983 Act, which appears as 42 USCS § 426-1 note), in subsec. (b)(2)(B), 
in the concluding matter, substituted "who has lawfully resided" for "and 
